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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
annulled the lease, unless by a proper survivorship clause the landlord reserved the option to keep it alive for the purpose of reletting
and holding the tenants for the deficiency.4 A mere provision that
in case of "re-entry" the lessor may so relet does not give him such
authority upon the recovery of possession by summary proceedings.6
Where, however, the parties by their contract give the word "reentry" a broader scope than its technical common-law definition,
such is not the case. 6 Therefore, until the landlord by some affirmative act terminates the lease, the action is premature.

PERFORMANCE-JURISDICTION-PERSONAL SERVICE
vendee brought an action to compel specific
performance of an agreement to convey real property situated in
Westchester County, N. Y. The vendor, a resident of Connecticut,
was not served in New York, nor did he appear in the action but he
was personally served with a copy of the summons and verified complaint in the State of Connecticut. The Supreme Court at Special
Term, issued an order directing the Sheriff to convey the property
to plaintiff as provided by statute. Defendant's motion to set aside
the service of the summons and complaint was denied.2 Upon
appeal he contended that the Court was without jurisdiction to make
the decree in question, since equity acts in personam merely, in the
absence of a statute enabling it to make a judgment in rem; that
there is no statute which authorizes personal service outside of the
State in an action for specific performance. Held, order affirmed.
The service was proper and sufficient to give the Court jurisdiction
to grant a judgment in rem, binding upon the non-resident. Garfein
v. Mclnnes, 248 N. Y. 261 (1928).
The language of the Civil Practice Act 3 is broad enough to
include an action for specific performance and service without the
State is sufficient to give the Court jurisdiction to render a judgment
in rem binding upon the non-resident so served. But a decree in
personam must be supported by actual service within the State.4
Consequently it is necessary to decide whether -the judgment is
directed solely against the defendant himself or whether it operates
directly upon the property resulting in a transfer of title to plaintiff.
That "equity acts in personam" is one of its oldest maxims and a
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RECENT DECISIONS
basic principle of its jurisdiction. 5 There is, however, no authority
which conclusively denies to equity the right or power to act in rem.
The method by which the early chancellors acted "upon the conscience
of defendants" 6 was simply a convenient mode of procedure, and not
due to any inherent disability to do otherwise. It has been held that
the power of a court of equity to pronounce a judgment in rem does
not depend on statute and may be exercised against a non-resident
whenever constructive service is allowed. 7 Many States have virtually abolished the ancient theory that equitable decrees are confined
or limited in effect 8 and have generally provided that in all cases
where justice requires it, a decree shall operate either ex propio vigore
to transfer title, or else the object of the judgment shall be accomplished by having an officer of the court, acting in the name of the
party against whom judgment has been had, convey the property.9
The Legislature has expressly provided that in an action of this
kind, the Court may enforce its decree by other means than a command to the defendant. 10 The effect of this legislation is to change
the nature of the action to one substantially in rem.""Cook, Powers of Courts of Equity, 15 Columbia Law Review, 37 (1915);
Felch v. Hooper, 119 Mass. 52 (1875); Merrill v. Beckwith, 163 Mass. 503
(1895); Fowler v. Fowler, 204 Ill. 82 (1903); Gardner v. Ogden, 22 N. Y.
327 (1860).
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